Why National Missile Defense Won't Work; August 1999; Scientific American Magazine; by Lewis, Postol, Pike; 6 Page(s)

In 1968, with the threat of intercontinental ballistic-missile attacks driving the U.S. toward the development of a national missile defense system, a Scientific American article written by physicists Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe described how China or the Soviet Union could easily elude the "light" U.S. missile shield then under development [see "Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems," March 1968]. This argument¿that any national defense system would be technologically ineffective¿ was one reason the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972. The fear that such a system would provoke the Soviet Union and escalate the arms race also contributed to the U.S. decision to sign the treaty, considered a landmark of arms control. To this day, the treaty prohibits the U.S. and Russia from deploying nationwide defense systems.

More than 30 years later the U.S. remains without a national missile defense system. The cold war threat of massive Soviet missile strikes has abated, but ballistic-missile technology is rapidly proliferating. U.S. concerns now center on the possibility that a rogue developing state could eventually acquire the ability to threaten or strike the U.S. with long-range missiles. Accidental Russian launches and China's small but potent missile force are considered secondary threats.